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Situationism, Capacities and Culpability1
[Pre-print: Please cite published version]

Abstract: The situationist experiments demonstrate that most people’s behaviour is
influenced by environmental factors much more than we expect, and that ordinary people
can be led to behave very immorally. A number of philosophers have investigated whether
these experiments demonstrate that subjects’ responsibility-relevant capacities are impeded.
This paper considers how, in practice, we can assess when agents have a reduced capacity to
avoid wrongdoing. It critiques some previously offered strategies including appeals to the
reasonable person standard, appeals to counterfactuals and understandability of behaviour,
and appeals to base rates of wrongdoing. It then proposes we should think a certain factor
impeded capacities when this is the best explanation of a change in patterns of responses.
With this approach in hand, I then argue that subjects in many of the situationist
experiments are (mostly) excused for their actions.

1. Introduction
The situationist experiments are a suite of studies demonstrating that most people’s
behaviour is influenced by seemingly irrelevant environmental factors much more than
expected. These studies first received philosophical attention in arguments regarding
whether we have empirical evidence for the kinds of global character traits proposed by
many theories of virtue (Doris, 2002; Harman, 2000; Kamtekar, 2004; Sabini & Silver, 2005).
A more recent area of interest has concerned whether the subjects who act wrongly in these
experiments are morally responsible for doing so (McKenna & Warmke, 2017; Nelkin, 2005;
Talbert, 2009). Given the subjects seem to be normal agents, and given their actions are
obviously wrong, some philosophers have wondered whether these subjects are in some
way prevented from doing the right thing, which could mitigate their blameworthiness.
Answering this requires that we grapple with a more basic question: in practice, how can
we tell when wrongdoers possessed the capacities required for moral responsibility? A
number of philosophers have examined the capacities of these subjects and come to different
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conclusions regarding their culpability. Though I ultimately side with those who argue that
subjects’ blameworthiness is significantly mitigated, I believe the ways in which parties to
this debate are making inferences about agential capacities require closer attention.
This paper considers how we can tell when an agent’s blameworthiness for wrongdoing
is excused or mitigated because they had a reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing. It
considers some existing proposals including appeals to the reasonable person standard,
appeals to relevant counterfactuals, appeals to base rates of wrongdoing, and appeals to the
understandability of responses, identifying problems with each. I argue that we should
think subjects lacked a certain capacity when this is the best explanation of changes in their
performance across a range of settings. Relying on evidence from a number of other studies,
I then argue that many subjects in the situationist experiments had a decreased capacity to
avoid wrongdoing.

2. The Situationist Experiments
Allow me to remind readers of some notable situationist experiments. Given they are wellknown and have been covered many times in the literature, I shall be brief:
 Dime: Subjects who had just exited a phonebooth encountered a confederate who
dropped some papers. In the control condition, only 4% of subjects helped the
confederate. But when subjects in the experimental condition first found a dime in the
phonebooth, 87.5% provided assistance (Isen & Levin, 1972).
 Bystander: A number of experiments demonstrate that an agent’s likelihood of helping
a stranger is reduced significantly by the presence of other people. For example, when by
themselves, 70% of subjects will check on someone in another room who is heard to cry
out in pain after a large crashing sound. But if unresponsive confederates are present,
only 7% will help (Latané & Rodin, 1969).
 Fire (a variant of Bystander): 75% of subjects in a room by themselves left within four
minutes of smoke beginning to billow in. However, when in the presence of two
confederates who ignored the smoke, 90% of subjects remained in the room. Had the
smoke been coming from a real fire, subjects would have remained long enough to die of
asphyxiation (Latané & Darley, 1970).
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 Samaritan: Seminarians were asked to give a speech on the parable of The Good
Samaritan. Upon arriving, they were told their talk had been moved elsewhere. On their
way to the second location, seminarians passed by someone who appeared to be
unconscious in the middle of the day. The chances of any seminarian stopping to help fell
dramatically if they were told they were running slightly late (10%), compared to if they
were told they were early (63%) (Darley & Batson, 1973).
 Obedience: Milgram (1963) had subjects administer shocks to a stranger as part of a
purported memory task. The subjects or ‘teachers’ would administer increasing shocks to
a ‘learner’ (actually a confederate who wasn’t receiving shocks) every time the learner got
an answer wrong. Even when the learner demanded to be let out, acted as if they’d had a
heart attack, and ceased responding altogether, 65% of subjects continued to administer
the dangerous shocks when directed.
These experiments are notable not only because many subjects act much worse than
expected, but because they seem to be caused to act wrongly by factors that seem
normatively irrelevant (or at least, only weakly relevant). The number of people nearby, a
dime, or someone in a lab coat, do not give us strong moral or prudential reasons to act any
differently, and yet they produce dramatic changes in people’s behaviour. As Nelkin (2005)
puts it: “the subjects seem to be acting for bad reasons, or at least not acting for good
reasons, and they seem stuck doing so” (p. 199).
This unusual ‘stuck’ behaviour of the subjects leads some to think that perhaps the
subjects who act wrongly might not be morally responsible for their actions, or at least, are
less responsible than they would be for other choices they make in their lives. To understand
why, we need to examine what it means to be morally responsible for something, and what
conditions agents must meet to qualify as responsible.

3. Capacities and Moral Responsibility
What does it mean to be morally responsible for an action? A common answer, which I will
adopt, is that to be morally responsible for one’s actions is to be connected to one’s actions in
such a way that makes one an appropriate target of blame (praise) for wrong (right) actions.
Blame is in turn understood as a negative reactive attitude that expresses disapproval of the
target’s conduct. Being blameworthy for wrongdoing is commonly taken to require that one
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possessed a certain kind of control over one’s actions. This in turn requires the possession of
certain capacities and opportunities, typically understood as the capacity to perceive moral
reasons, the capacity to then act on those reasons, and the opportunity to exercise those
capacities (Brink & Nelkin, 2013; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Franklin, 2013; Vargas, 2013). If I
fail to save a child from drowning in a lake because I am not capable of swimming, or have
been tied up by a rope, then I am not morally responsible for failing to save the child
precisely because I lacked the capacities or opportunities necessary to do so. Capacities and
opportunities can come in degrees, and agents can have a reduced capacity or opportunity
even if they do not lack it altogether, which will result in reduced blameworthiness in the
event of wrongdoing (Nelkin, 2016).
Some care must be taken identifying capacities for the purposes of assessing
blameworthiness. For example, some philosophers say that an agent who is tied up lacks the
opportunity to exercise their swimming capacities, while others will say that the agent has
the general capacity to swim but lacks the specific capacity to swim. Jaster (forthcoming)
points out that the distinction between general capacities, specific capacities, and
opportunities is really just a matter of what factors we hold fixed. Some capacities depend
on factors external to the agent (the capacity to baptise depends on being ordained), some
opportunities are lacking in virtue of features internal to the agent (being bed-ridden
prevents one from exercising their capacity to play soccer), and the distinction between
general and specific is more of a gradient that depends on the number of factors we want to
hold fixed. Given it is natural to talk about the capacity to do the right thing for the right
reasons, for our purposes it will be fine to, at times, individuate capacities in a way that
includes opportunities. An agent who has a duty to swim to save someone, and who has the
general capacity to swim but is tied up, lacks the capacity to do the right thing in this
situation.
A further complication is that when it comes to assessing blameworthiness, establishing
that an agent has a specific capacity in one sense might not establish that they have the
specific capacity in the sense required for moral responsibility. Care must be taken when
individuating what ‘the right thing’ is. Consider Austin’s (1956) putt that he could have
made, but didn’t. Austin lines up the putt, tries his hardest to sink the ball, and misses. All
the same, we would say that he had the specific capacity to make that putt. But were
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something moral at stake such that failing to sink the putt would lead to some terrible
outcome, we would not move from the observation that Austin had the specific capacity to
make the putt to the conclusion that he was therefore morally blameworthy for missing.
Intuitively, he would not be a fitting target of moral blame.
A tempting way to account for our intuitions here is to say that, in this situation, ‘the
right thing’ to do is simply to try and sink the putt, which Austin did. However, this move
comes with a risk because trying itself often looks a lot like a capacity. And arguing that one
is culpable for not Φ-ing only if one had the capacity to try to Φ risks a regress, as agents
would then first need to have the capacity to try to try to Φ, and so on (Jaster, 2020; Small,
2017).2 Instead, Jaster (2020) points out that we need to distinguish between agentive
capacities, which are capacities to perform actions, and non-agentive capacities, which are
triggered by certain stimuli but are still bona fide capacities. Wanting, trying, intending, and
recognising, among others, are all non-agentive capacities, as is the capacity to try to sink a
putt as best one can.3 Although we are interested in whether Austin has the capacity to try to
sink the putt, in other cases we may be interested in whether the agent had e.g. the capacity
to recognise that a certain moral fact obtains, not the capacity to try to recognise that a fact
obtains.4
To answer whether the wrongdoing subjects in the situationist experiments had the
capacities necessary for moral responsibility, we need an investigation into how we know
when agents lack certain capacities and the structure of our reasoning when making such
assessments. Let’s now consider four existing proposals for assessing when an agent lacks a
particular capacity.

4. How Do We Assess Capacities?

See Jaster (2020) for objections to attempts to understand capacities in terms of conditional
analysis or appeals to nearby possible worlds. This paper’s question and argument is still
relevant to proponents of such views, as in practice we can’t directly look into nearby
possible worlds, nor do we often know what conditionals are true of an agent.
2

See Hieronymi (2007) and McGeer and Pettit (2015) on how explanations for why agents
act in one way rather than another run out at some point, and how this can pose problems
for some conceptions of capacity.
3
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4.1 The Reasonable Person Standard
Ciurria (2013) and Doris (2007) argue that the number of people who act a certain way in a
particular situation can help us determine what can be expected of ‘a reasonable person’ in
that situation. In everyday life and in our legal system, we often make culpability
judgements according to such a standard, rather than assessing each person’s capacities on
an individual basis. We can’t access other people’s minds to assess their quality of will or
reasons-responsiveness, so we require some other standard by which to judge their actions.
Ciurria argues that how most people behave in a situation can be an indicator of an
individual’s capacities, as most people are reasonable. If the majority of people fail to act a
certain way in a particular setting, this is evidence that we could not reasonably expect most
people to have done otherwise in that setting, and this may be grounds for excusing the
obedient subjects since a majority of all subjects obeyed. Doris points out that, although we
can’t determine excuses entirely by the rates at which people act, “still, reflection on base
rates helps determine what can fairly be expected of a particular individual in particular
circumstances; surely it is partly because most people yield under torture that it seems
unfair to hold victims responsible for failing to resist it” (2007, p. 527).
The reasonable person standard does not assess responsibility on the basis of base rates
alone. It allows us to rely on ‘other evidence’ of an individual’s capacities. While one could
object that without further explication of what this other evidence is, the standard risks
being unsystematic and unhelpful for adjudicating between disagreeing assessments, I want
to note a greater problem with it. This is a problem which is easy to miss when reasoning
about the capacities of individuals generally, and which we need to be careful to avoid in
our current investigation.
Many philosophers make a point of noting that in no situationist experiment do 100% of
subjects act wrongly, including Adams (2006, p. 149), Badhwar (2009, p. 261), Brink (2013, p.
129), Solomon (2003, p. 56; 2005, p. 653), and Wielenberg (2006, p. 448). The purpose of
drawing our attention to this fact often seems to be to suggest that since some subjects did
the right thing, this is evidence that subjects who acted wrongly had the capacity to do the
right thing too. This move is curious though, given that, upon reflection, even if 100% of
subjects did the wrong thing in some experiments, this wouldn’t prove their capacities had
been affected in some way. Nelkin (2005) points out that if 100% of customers who enter a
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bank wait in line, this does not show that they were unable to do otherwise or somehow
forced to act as they did by features of the banking environment. This may seem to favour
thinking that the subjects in fact had the relevant capacities. But this reasoning cuts both
ways: if the base rate of wrongdoing is immaterial to showing that wrongdoing subjects
lacked certain capacities, it also does not show that they possessed certain capacities either.
Both the reasonable person standard and aforementioned appeals to right-doing subjects
involve making inferences about a particular agent’s capacities by referring to the observed
behaviour of other agents. The problem is that this move relies on first having identified a
relevant reference class for said comparison, and the way this is chosen may fail to notice
relevant differences between agents. For example, if we applied a reasonable person
standard to assessing the capacities of ‘all 6th graders’ on a reading task, we would observe
that there are no constraints on behaviour and that most 6th graders could pass the task. We
would thus be at risk of concluding the children with dyslexia are merely being inattentive.
It is only once we change our reference class from ‘all 6th graders’ to ‘all 6th graders with
dyslexia’ that we can then apply the reasonable person standard to get the correct
assessments. Situationist settings may be the kind of thing that have a negative—albeit local
and temporary—effect on some people’s capacities, but which we just haven’t yet identified.
To show how this worry applies to our current investigation, consider one of the
variations of Obedience in which only 20% of subjects obeyed. Although most subjects were
raised in the same country and within a similar time period, there might still be tremendous
variation between subjects regarding their upbringing and previous experiences which could
affect their present capacities. It is true that not every subject obeyed and so, at first glance,
when we apply the reasonable person standard, a-reasonable-person-placed-in-this-setting
would not administer shocks at 450V. But it could also turn out that a-reasonable-personplaced-in-this-setting-who-was-not-taught-how-to-question-authority would in fact obey.
For example, Adrian Dimow, one of the subjects who disobeyed very early in the most
famous variant of Obedience, reports that he disobeyed because he didn’t trust the
experimenters, rather than out of any concern for the learner. He had been raised to distrust
authority in a “socialist-oriented family steeped in a class struggle view of society [which]
taught me that authorities would often have a different view of right and wrong than mine”
(Dimow, 2004; Perry, 2013a, p. 127). He had also been harassed by the FBI while a member
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of the Communist Party. These experiences were clearly not had by the majority of the other
subjects, and acted as a relevant difference which led to him finding it much easier to resist
the influence of the authority figure. His interpretation of the setting, his perception of the
experimenter, and what considerations he took to be present were all very different to those
of other subjects. That there was likely to be variation in subjects’ interpretation of their
setting, the pressure they felt, their perception of the experimenter, and understanding of
what was at stake has been noted several times by philosophers arguing that the studies do
not rule out the existence of global character traits (e.g. Kamtekar, 2004; Sreenivasan, 2002).
The relevance for us is that such factors also plausibly affect the extent to which each subject
had the capacity to disobey.

4.2 Counterfactuals
A second means of assessing capacities comes from Brink (2013), and is later endorsed by
McKenna and Warmke (2017). Brink argues that we should assess an agent’s capacities by
examining how the agent would act in relevantly similar counterfactual situations.
Regarding Obedience, he argues that the obedient subjects are responsible agents, because
there are relevantly similar counterfactual scenarios in which subjects would successfully
disobey, e.g., “if they had been given more time to consider their options, if they had been
asked to justify the imposition of apparent harm to innocent parties, or if they had known
the learners” (p. 141). Whereas Ciurria and Doris assessed an agent’s capacities by looking at
how relevantly similar agents would act in a particular setting, Brink looks at the particular
agent across relevantly similar settings. This enables Brink to avoid the reference class
problem, since we do not have to categorise an agent into a particular class before making
our assessment.
The problem for this approach regards which counterfactuals are relevant, and how we
interpret the outcomes of those counterfactuals. Grant Brink’s supposition that an obedient
subject would have disobeyed had they been given more time to consider their options. This
could be taken to show the subject had the capacity to disobey in the actual sequence all
along. But it could also be taken to show that the actual sequence of events was relevantly
different to a setting where that subject had more time. The counterfactual could instead
show that something we assumed had no effect on an agent’s capacities, namely time
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pressure, was in fact significant.5 It could instead show that subjects’ capacity to disobey is
reduced in novel situations, and that doing the right thing in unfamiliar situations without
certain information (i.e. what has happened when one has acted in certain ways in this
situation in the past) is more difficult than we typically assume. By analogy, the fact that an
agent can quickly learn to reliably make successful putts can show they possessed the
capacity to make a putt on their first failed attempt, but it can also show that they gained a
capacity they initially lacked.
One particular type of counterfactual is relevant to assessing the capacities of the
obedient subjects. Since we’re assessing the capacity of subjects to resist-strong-socialpressures-to-harm-others-in-novel-situations, Brink treats the relevant counterfactuals as
ones where the source of social pressures and the overall task remain fixed. But if we’re
truly interested in this capacity, it matters how subjects would behave in other, very
different situations that still involve strong social pressures and causing harm to others. For
example, we might be interested in how the obedient subjects would behave if they were
placed in a Stanford Prison Experiment-like setting with the original pressures (Haney,
Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), or various military settings featuring strong pressures and
gradually escalating demands (Browning, 2001).

4.3 Predictive Likelihoods
Another means of assessing capacities comes from Rudy-Hiller (2020). Rudy-Hiller argues
that although it is commonplace to think there is a distinction between what we can
reasonably expect of people in a normative sense (i.e. how people should behave; what it is
reasonable to demand of people) and what we can reasonably expect of people in a
predictive sense (i.e. how they will in fact behave), the latter can help us determine the
former. More specifically, the expected likelihood of wrongdoing can affect what we can
reasonably demand of one another because it helps us identify when agents have a reduced
capacity or opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Once we have an explanation for why a
particular environmental factor increases wrongdoing, and that factor plausibly reduces an
agent’s quality of opportunity (the fairness of their opportunity to avoid wrongdoing by
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exercising their capacities), a high likelihood of wrongdoing in the presence of that factor
enables us to conclude that avoiding wrongdoing is very difficult, which in turn “make it the
case that normative expectations in these situations are less reasonable” (p. 2956, emphasis
original).6 Since most people fail to do the right thing in Bystander, this, along with plausible
explanations of why the bystander effect occurs (e.g. pluralistic ignorance), demonstrates
that it is very difficult to do the right thing in these settings. This gives us evidence that
subjects in fact have a reduced opportunity to do the right thing, entailing that their
culpability is mitigated or possibly even exculpated.
While I am sympathetic to this argument, I have a few concerns.7 First, the extent to
which a proposed explanation indicates that agents’ capacities or opportunities are
diminished seems to depend on already assuming quite a bit about capacities and
situational aptness. Rudy-Hiller takes pluralistic ignorance to decrease situational aptness
because its effect on interpretation happens automatically and without subjects being aware
of its occurrence, meaning they have little chance to overcome it. But one can question
whether automaticity and lack of awareness necessarily reduce quality of opportunity.
Automaticity is arguably a feature of many of our cognitive processes and thus capacities
(particularly non-agentive ones), and unless one thinks that unwitting wrongdoing is always
excused (discussed further below), appeals to a lack of awareness need to show that the
agent’s lack of awareness wasn’t culpable.8

Since quality of opportunity tracks fairness of demands, it can include factors beyond
capacity and situational features that might impede their execution. Nelkin (2016) points out
that one might have a poor quality of opportunity to Φ because Φ-ing will impose high costs
or require sacrifice. Even if one is very willing and able to Φ (in that it will be easy to Φ
should they choose to), they can still have a poor quality of opportunity to Φ due to said
costs, such that they will not be blameworthy for failing to Φ.
6

As we will see later, my account is compatible with what Rudy-Hiller is getting at. But we
first need to establish some foundation from which to identify when agents have a lack of
capacity rather than just an unexercised capacity, and this is what I will provide in §5.
7

While Rudy-Hiller (2017) himself does not think ignorance is always excusing, he seems to
think it isn’t reasonable to expect subjects to correct for the effects of pluralistic ignorance
given they don’t know about it, and this is the most reliable way of overcoming it (fn. 38).
But it seems that subjects who provide help don’t do so by knowing about the bystander
effect and correcting for it; rather, they just have a more accurate perception of their reasons
to help, or they just avoid succumbing to the effect in the first place. And this is the kind of
thing which the non-helping subjects may still have sufficient capacity to do.
8
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Second, the explanation seems to do most of the work in these capacity assessments.
Rudy-Hiller takes predictive likelihood to be relevant in the following way: with our
explanation of the factor’s (capacity-compromising) effect on behaviour in hand, predictive
expectations allow us to measure the pervasiveness of the factor (how frequently said factor
has effects) on agency. And when the relevant factor is capacity-compromising,
pervasiveness is a good proxy for the potency of that factor. Potency in turn is a measure of
how difficult it is for people to overcome a factor’s negative effects on their agency. A
decrease in likelihood of doing the right thing thus entails that doing the right thing is more
difficult. But the problem with this reasoning concerns how we know that a factor affects
behaviour by increasing difficulty. For example, large changes in the base rates of
wrongdoing might result from only minor changes in difficulty, if people’s subjective
reasons only barely favour doing right prior to the minor increase in difficulty. Additionally,
it’s possible that situationist factors could decrease our capacities slightly, while also acting
as a form of circumstantial moral luck that causes us to act on different reasons (Herdova &
Kearns, 2015) but does not impede our capacities. Given circumstantial moral luck doesn’t
necessarily undermine blameworthiness or capacities in other settings, agents affected by
the bystander effect might still be mostly blameworthy. To the extent that one may want to
argue against these possibilities, one would be drawn back to considering the original
explanation of the behaviour.9
Finally, without saying more about what difficulty is, appealing to base rates as evidence
introduces a potential for circularity.10 Rudy-Hiller sets aside the question of what difficulty
is and its relation to blameworthiness, taking us to have a sufficiently intuitive grasp of what
it amounts to and what role it should play in mitigating culpability. We can see why this

In response to the worry that pluralistic ignorance might only somewhat degrade quality of
opportunity, Rudy-Hiller appeals “to the nature of the social interpretative process that
leads to this kind of ignorance—its automaticity and its proceeding undetected by those
who are subject to it—and how this process undermines agential control” (p. 2964). But this
is just appealing back to the force of the original explanation, and someone like Brink might
not take this to yet demonstrate a lack of control or capacity. Similarly, to the extent that
base rates “confirm” (p. 2957) the difficulty, we may need to already think the task is
difficult, which takes us back to considering evidence for the explanation.
9

To emphasise, it is not in fact circular, nor is Guerrero’s characterisation. However, we first
need to do some more work in §5 to understand why.
10
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move is problematic by considering existing analyses of difficulty within the literature. To
say that X is difficult could mean:
 X requires sacrifice (Nelkin, 2016)
 X requires effort (Bradford, 2015; Nelkin, 2016)
 X requires skill (Guerrero, 2017)
 X has a low probability of success (Guerrero, 2017; von Kriegstein, 2019)11
Clearly, the first sense of difficulty is not relevant to the present discussion—none of the
situationist experiments require subjects to make substantial sacrifices. And Rudy-Hiller
agrees that effort is not the relevant sense of difficulty (p. 2961). Though the fact that moving
furniture would require effort may make a refusal to help less blameworthy than if it
required little effort, doing the right thing in the situationist experiments typically doesn’t
require much effort at all, and the factors which increase the rates of wrongdoing don’t do so
by making avoiding wrongdoing more effortful. The third sense is plausible, as there is
significant overlap between things that are skills and things that are capacities, and
responding to moral reasons could be understood as a skill. But since we are investigating
difficulty in order to assess quality of opportunity, we would need to understand how the
claim that ‘base rates suggest overcoming pluralistic ignorance requires skill’ is distinct from
the claim that ‘base rates suggest overcoming pluralistic ignorance requires certain kinds of
capacities to a particular degree’, given the latter is precisely what is at issue.
This leaves us with difficulty as a low probability of success, which Von Kriegstein (2019)
argues the other senses of difficulty typically boil down to.12 But now reconsider our
reasoning when we take a proposed explanation of the subjects’ behaviour—pluralistic
ignorance—to be a plausible mitigating factor: the fact that so many subjects who experience
pluralistic ignorance failed to do the right thing suggests they should be excused, because
the low success rate is evidence that doing the right thing was difficult. But to say that
‘doing the right thing in these settings is difficult’ just is to say that there is a low probability
that one will succeed in doing the right thing when experiencing pluralistic ignorance. This

‘Difficulty in trying’, which Rudy-Hiller (2020) takes to apply to overcoming pluralistic
ignorance, is cashed out by Guerrero (2017, p. 204) simply in terms of it being unlikely that
an agent will try.
11

12

Relative to some contextually-defined reference class of agents.
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is clearly unsatisfying, and so we need to continue our search for a principled method of
assessing the capacities of the subjects in the situationist experiments.

4.4 Patterns of Success
A final method involving counterfactuals comes from Herdova and Kearns (2017), who
modify Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) account of reasons-responsiveness. Like many others,
Herdova and Kearns take two capacities to be essential to moral responsibility: reasonsreceptivity and reasons-reactivity. An agent is more reasons-receptive to the extent that they
recognise patterns of moral reasons. An agent is more reasons-reactive to the extent that,
after recognising a moral reason, they act on said moral reason. Herdova and Kearns’s novel
contribution is to propose that an agents’ degree of reasons-responsiveness is determined by
the understandability of the agent’s pattern of behaviour across a range of counterfactual
situations. Understandability is here understood from a rational standpoint, rather than a
psychological or scientific standpoint. Agents are more responsible for their actions the more
that they display an understandable reaction to patterns of reasons.
Herdova and Kearns argue that the situationist experiments do not show that the subjects
lack reasons-responsiveness to any significant degree. This is because across a range of
counterfactual situations, subjects would recognise and react to moral reasons. Indeed,
many do just that in the control conditions. Because subjects’ pattern of responsiveness is
overall understandable, they retain the relevant capacities necessary for responsibility.
Herdova and Kearns admit that the subjects’ responsiveness is slightly less understandable
than it otherwise would be if the situationist factors had no impact on subjects’ behaviour,
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and so subjects may be slightly less blameworthy than if they had committed wrongdoing in
the absence of those situationist factors.13
Though I don’t have any objections to this proposed account of blameworthiness, there is
a problem with its application to particular settings: assessing whether a pattern of
responses is understandable tacitly relies on us already having a certain conception of what
capacities and opportunities agents have in what settings. For example, suppose that I fail to
help someone in need whenever a ‘pared’ is between me and the person, but regularly help
when a pared is absent. Without knowing what a pared is or how it affects agents, we could
conclude that, given my overall pattern of responses across a range of counterfactuals is
mostly understandable, I remain responsible for my failure. But suppose we now find out
that ‘pared’ is the Spanish word for ‘wall’. Now my behaviour becomes perfectly
understandable—I can’t see through walls. But we are only able to make this assessment
because we already know something about human perceptual capacities and how walls
inhibit the visual detection of things that are behind them. We need to assess my
responsibility for failing to notice my reasons to give aid given there is a large wall and given
I cannot see through walls. Without this knowledge, my failure to help when a pared is
present looks simply like an odd bug in my responsiveness, and we will erroneously
conclude I am blameworthy because I manage to give aid in a number of other possible
circumstances when walls are absent.
This point generalises in a way that justifies individuating capacities in more fine-grained
ways than we typically do. Consider agents who, as a result of brain damage, can recognise
objects when held at some orientations but not others, or can recognise what an object is but
not what it is used for, or can recognise moving objects but not still objects (De Renzi, 2000).

It is worth noting that Fischer (with Tognazzini, 2011) takes blameworthiness to not be
decided by reasons-responsiveness alone. Instead, once we have established that an agent is
sufficiently reasons-responsive (understood as an all-or-nothing property), it is a further
question whether the agent is blameworthy or excused due to things like ignorance. In
contrast, Herdova and Kearns take reasons-responsiveness to determine blameworthiness
directly, though they are also open to reasons-responsive agents being excused because they
lack the opportunity to exercise their capacities. This seems to leave it unclear how they
would excuse the kinds of agents that Fischer takes to be morally responsible, but not
blameworthy e.g. a mother who wrongly saves her own child over multiple strangers, or
wrongdoers from poor formative circumstances.
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15
Unless we already know to examine their performance in contexts where the objects are e.g.
held at a certain angle, answering ‘Do these agents have the capacity to recognise objects?’
based on whether they successfully recognise objects in most situations will give us the
incorrect answer. Even if understandability is the correct criterion for assessing capacities,
we can’t identify understandability by looking at responses to various settings alone. We
need to know something about those settings and about agents generally.
Herdova and Kearns imply that their account is relativised to the evidence that agents
have (p. 164) and that they accept that agents can be excused because they lack the
opportunity to exercise any general capacities they do have (fn. 27).14 However, they think a
particular consideration counts against taking the wrongdoing subjects in the situationist
experiments to be excused. This is that a certain kind of counterfactual seems true of the
subjects, which is not true of people behind walls or with the aforementioned kinds of brain
damage: were the subjects to stop to reflect on their reasons, or were they to expend more
mental effort, they would have recognised them.15 And it seems implausible to say that an
expenditure of mental effort causes subjects’ capacity to avoid wrongdoing to be restored;
rather, subjects would simply be exercising a capacity they already possessed.
These kinds of counterfactuals face a well-known problem: they give incorrect verdicts
for cases where something is inhibiting someone’s capacity to try or to expend effort. It
might be true that someone in a coma would recognise their reasons were they to expend
mental effort doing so, but all the same, they lack the capacity to recognise their reasons
(Jaster, 2020). Herdova and Kearns acknowledge the counterfactual only ‘typically’ gives the
right verdict, but given the surprisingness of the subjects’ behaviour, it is a live option that
some situationist experiments are exceptions. This point applies particularly in cases where
the capacity to reflect and think clearly, or to translate one’s judgments into action, is

Herdova and Kearns take agents to have a specific capacity when they have a general
capacity and opportunity to exercise said capacity. They take themselves to be assessing
whether the situationist subjects have the general capacity to do the right thing (fn. 27),
presumably because there are no visible external factors which could impede their general
capacities. But as noted earlier, opportunities can be lacking due to factors internal to agents,
so we need some prior way of identifying what things reduce an agent’s opportunity to
exercise their general capacities.
14
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‘Effort’ is understood in terms of energy expenditure. See Herdova and Kearns (2019).
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precisely the thing that is being inhibited, and below I’ll argue that this is the case for some
of the experiments.16 We need to hold certain factors fixed when we make our capacity
assessments.
Herdova and Kearns worry that giving up this counterfactual may generalise in
problematic ways. Won’t we have to conclude, for example, that the man who regularly gets
into fights after having alcohol, but never when a police officer is present, thereby lacks the
capacity to avoid fights but gains this capacity when police officers are nearby? Not
necessarily. If this person always gets into fights when drunk (including all cases where
doing so is extremely costly, or if they were to e.g. unknowingly have their drink spiked at a
ballet recital) and never when in the presence of a police officer (including an officer from
another country, with no jurisdiction to arrest anyone) then we would think that such a
person really does lose their capacity. Such a pattern of behaviour would be positively
bizarre.17 But it’s because fight-prone agents don’t display such reasons-insensitivity that we
think they are responsible, and in any case, experience should have taught them to not drink
in the first place.
Still, there is a legitimate worry here: if we can’t assess an agent’s capacity to do the right
thing by asking whether an agent would do the right thing were they to reflect on their
reasons or expend effort, which counterfactuals do we use? And how do we assess the
understandability of a pattern of responses within said counterfactuals without
presupposing some conception of capacities and opportunities, and without saying that
agents who regularly commit wrongdoing in some settings because they just don’t care are
excused?

5. Capacities and Inferences

Additionally, once we have an explanation of why some subjects do manage to do the
right thing, we will see that this doesn’t seem to be attributable to them simply exerting
more effort.
16

Herdova and Kearns express some sympathy for thinking that agents who inexplicably
fail to respond to reasons in some circumstances are excused precisely because their regular
success in responding to reasons in other situations is evidence that something has gone
amiss in their functioning (fn. 22). But this seems to be how we ought to describe the subjects
in the situationist experiments. The inexplicableness is what makes these studies so
interesting the first time one hears about them.
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Let’s take stock. Suppose we accept that an agent has a general capacity to Φ (evidenced by
the fact that they often Φ in many ordinary settings), and we now want to assess whether
they are blameworthy for failing to Φ in a particular setting. Our basic challenge is that we
need a way to tell whether they had the specific capacity (in the sense relevant to
blameworthiness) to Φ and just didn’t exercise it, or whether they lacked this capacity. We
have seen that philosophers typically try to assess whether an agent has said specific
capacity by looking at how the agent would respond in various settings. But this requires us
to already have some account of which settings are relevant—which counterfactuals to
apply, which possible worlds to examine, or which factors to hold fixed when examining
patterns of responses.
I believe we can find a foundation from which to make our assessments. The approach I
would like to take exploits our status as beings generally capable of acting according to
reasons. Here’s the proposal: rather than looking at a particular agent in a particular setting,
and observing how they (or other agents) behave when we modify various features of said
situation, we can instead find cases where certain regular patterns of behaviour are best
explained as the result of a particular factor reducing agents’ capacities, given we already
know something about agents’ motivations and incentives. This allows us to build up
knowledge about what kinds of factors generally degrade capacities, and we can work from
there to make assessments of particular agents in particular settings.
For example, suppose we observe that I regularly succeed at completing a Stroop test
without error in under 30 seconds when offered financial incentives, but regularly fail to
complete the test in under 10 seconds when offered equal or greater financial incentives.
Given I generally seem pretty motivated to complete quick tasks for money, and given
reducing the time of the test from 30 to 10 seconds doesn’t introduce any factors likely to
reduce my motivation to try my hardest, the best explanation for my continued failure
seems to be that I lack the capacity to complete this Stroop test in under 10 seconds.
This approach seems promising, but here’s one potential worry: agents can sometimes
succeed in more challenging circumstances, without this thereby showing that they also had
the specific capacity in less challenging circumstances. Consider the following cases:
Sleepy: The longer that Neil stays awake, the less money will be taken from a charity.
Neil stays awake for 50 hours.
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Fearful: If Neil falls asleep, his children will be maimed. The more time that passes, the
higher the chance that his child’s abductors will be caught before the maiming. Neil
stays awake for 100 hours.
Suppose someone reasoned in the following way: we know Neil cares about charities,
and was motivated to stay awake for 50 hours. And this suggests that he lacked the capacity
to stay awake for longer. But he did stay awake longer when he was more motivated to do
so in Fearful. So Neil actually had the capacity to stay awake for more than 50 hours in Sleepy
all along. He simply didn’t try hard enough.
This reasoning seems mistaken. Rather than thinking Neil just wasn’t motivated enough
in Sleepy, most of us would conclude that Neil had a greater capacity to stay awake in
Fearful. But how do we show this, beyond reflecting on our own experience with trying to
stay awake? We would say something like his appraisal of the second situation as dangerous
to his children triggered certain responses in his brain and body e.g. greater arousal and
adrenaline which reduce the drive for sleep. Importantly, these factors are not under Neil’s
control, and were absent in Sleepy. So it makes sense to say that Fearful itself is not proof that
Neil had the capacity to stay awake (in the sense required for blameworthiness) for longer
than 50 hours in Sleepy, even though Fearful is similar to Sleepy and Neil in fact stayed
awake for longer in Fearful.
This case illustrates how we tacitly rely on a host of background beliefs when making
capacity assessments. This is important to acknowledge because if our background beliefs
are mistaken, we may overestimate agents’ capacity to perform certain actions in certain
circumstances. But how do we know that factors like adrenaline and physiological arousal
affect one’s capacity to stay awake in the first place? We’ve already seen that we can’t assess
the subjects’ capacities by simply investigating whether the subjects would have succeeded
at doing the right thing if they’d been given more time, or if they were placed in an identical
setting again some time later. But counterfactuals like these are useful in another way. By
assessing performance in a range of circumstances where agents’ motivations (or at least,
mechanisms capable of generating action) should be constant, we can learn what sorts of
factors generally reduce people’s capacities, and then see if those factors are present in the
setting we’re interested in.
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This is how we gain our background knowledge regarding things like fatigue and
adrenaline which informed our assessment of Neil in Fearful. One can readily find evidence
that sleep deprivation impedes cognitive capacities by observing that people who are sleepdeprived regularly perform much worse at a range of tasks. While it is possible that sleepdeprived people are simply much less motivated to perform those tasks, it is implausible
that they are more likely to crash their car while driving because their sleep-deprivation
makes them simply care less about living. One can find similar evidence that adrenaline
enhances physical capacities, by noting that it increases physical performance in a range of
ways, even though performance did not previously increase when the agent was given
additional incentives. This background knowledge then allows us to make inferences about
more complex cases.18
Once we’ve identified that severe sleep deprivation significantly reduces an agent’s
capacity to e.g. pay attention to the road, we can work backwards and infer that slight sleep
deprivation will somewhat reduce an agent’s capacity to pay attention. Assessing whether it
reduces it enough to excuse any particular agent for failing to pay attention may be
difficult.19 But roughly, since we take it that the agent has very strong reasons to pay
attention which they experience as motivating, the more that their behaviour deviates from
paying attention in the manner that they normally would, the more likely it is that sleep
deprivation is degrading their capacity to pay attention.
A complication is that some factors greatly decrease an agents’ chances of success, but we
typically don’t take this to show that the agent lacked the relevant capacity. For example,
forming an intention and resolution to do wrong is likely to be the kind of thing which
greatly decreases the chances that an agent avoids wrongdoing. But we would not say that
agents with such intentions therefore lack the capacity to avoid wrongdoing. Instead, we
naturally tend to assess whether agents have the capacity to avoid wrongdoing prior to
forming any such intention. To frame it another way, we can grant that intentions and

We have to be careful to watch out for interaction effects. Injuring my left hand won’t
greatly affect my capacity to open a door, injuring my right hand won’t either, but it would
be incorrect to infer from this that injuring both hands wouldn’t greatly affect me.
18

Stipulating that the agent can’t pull over to rest, and is not culpable for being sleep
deprived in the first place.
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resolutions do impede capacities, but then ask whether the agent had the capacity to avoid
forming the intention or resolution which impeded their capacity. Since the answer is often
yes, ordinary agents who form an intention or resolution to do wrong retain the capacity to
avoid wrongdoing.20
This move allows us to handle another potential worry: if we’re assessing the capacity of
agents by looking at their success rates given various incentives, won’t this entail that agents
who commit unwitting wrongdoing (wrongdoing due to e.g. ignorance, forgetting, failing to
notice something, misjudging) are always excused? After all, if anything reduces the chance
of doing the right thing, being unaware of what the right thing to do is certainly will. Such
an argument has been used to argue for volitionism, the position that agents can only be
blameworthy for actions or omissions which are the result of some act of volition, and so
agents can only be directly blameworthy for knowingly committing wrongdoing (Levy,
2011; Rosen, 2004; Zimmerman, 1997). Most capacitarians, however, accept that agents can
be blameworthy for unwitting wrongdoing given they could have avoided their ignorance
in some sense (Amaya & Doris, 2015; Murray & Vargas, 2020; Rudy-Hiller, 2017).21
Unwittingness itself is not the kind of feature that we hold fixed and then ask whether the
agent had the capacity to do otherwise. Just as we ask whether someone had the capacity to
avoid intending to do wrong, we can ask whether they had the capacity to avoid their lack

Note too that while a very high proportion of agents who experience weakness of will or
akrasia fail to act according to the balance of reasons, treating these as relevant factors for
investigation risks gerrymandering the set of relevant cases. These terms pick out cases
where the agent/s already failed to act according to their better judgement (which often is the
correct moral judgment, Huck Finn cases being an exception), and exclude cases where the
agent/s succeeded. Instead, when asking whether such agents had the capacity to avoid
wrongdoing, we need to treat the relevant factor as something like ‘experiencing a contrary
desire of a particular strength’ and then look at success rates. This is compatible with
thinking that some instances of weakness of will are excused, perhaps those involved in
severe depression, because depressive episodes regularly decrease agents’ performance at
various tasks to a large degree.
20

Settling this debate requires engaging with the further question here about what justifies
blame, which I will have to set aside. Levy (2011) appeals to desert considerations, and
argues that agents who did not knowingly choose to do wrong do not deserve blame.
Capacitarians are generally more inclined to argue that blame is justified on account of our
occupying certain roles (Rudy-Hiller, 2017), or having a zone of competence (Amaya and
Doris, 2015), or that certain patterns of responses to reasons are the result of cognitive
architecture which constitutes our agential control (Murray and Vargas, 2020).
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of awareness. If the agent is generally successful at identifying what the right thing to do is
in most ordinary contexts, they have the general capacity to do so. If they fail on a particular
occasion, we can investigate whether there might be some factors present which degraded
their capacity, but ignorance itself is not always not capacity-compromising.
We can still apply the same kind of tests to work out what factors degrade epistemic
capacities, including reasons-recognition. For example, people regularly fail to recognise
certain features of their situation when they also have to complete some other task
simultaneously, when they have limited time, or when they are intoxicated. Furthermore,
their performance with these factors present typically wouldn’t improve with added
incentives, and at a certain level of e.g. intoxication they won’t perform at all. This is good
evidence that alcohol, additional tasks and reduced time reduce an agent’s capacity to
recognise features of their situation.
We can now see why the previous attempts to assess capacities are appealing. The
reasonable person standard often gives the right result because most agents are generally
reasons-responsive, we can usually recognise what kinds of factors don’t provide agents
reason to change their behaviour, and so the higher the number of people who fail to follow
reasons, the more likely it is that their capacities are being affected. Counterfactuals are often
useful because they can establish that an agent has a general capacity to Φ. If we then see no
reason why the agent shouldn’t have the specific capacity to Φ, this suggests that the agent’s
failure is attributable to them simply failing to exercise their capacities. Base rates, in tandem
with plausible explanations, are convincing because if that explanation is complete (in that
we’ve ruled out all other possible explanations and contributing factors) and the factor
identified works by decreasing capacities, base rates just do measure the degree to which
agents’ capacities are degraded by that factor, as such patterns of responses just are the
degree to which agents’ reasons-responsiveness is deviating from its normal standard. And
how understandable a pattern of responses appears will depend upon things like an agent’s
motivations, our background beliefs about an agents’ capacities, what factors we think to
hold fixed, and in most cases we can accurately assess these. Each of these approaches often
draws the lines between blameworthy and excused in approximately the right place. But as
argued earlier, these tests can give the wrong result when there are unrecognised differences
between agents, when particular environmental factors have effects in ways that we don’t
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yet recognise, when we haven’t demonstrated that our explanation proves reduced capacity,
and when our assessments of patterns rely on mistaken assumptions.
Let’s return to the role that explanations and base rates play. Rudy-Hiller (2020) started
with a proposed explanation—pluralistic ignorance—and, by reflecting on the nature of that
phenomenon, argued it reduced capacities. I noted that this requires assuming some things
about capacities and what impedes them, that the explanation might be compatible with
agents possessing but not exercising capacities, and that even if it does impede capacities,
we need to rule out the possibility that it may do so slightly. My approach proceeds in the
other direction: examine patterns of responses beyond that of the experiment, observe that,
given what we know about agents’ motivations and incentives, said patterns cannot
plausibly be explained by anything other than a reduction in capacities, and then arrive at
pluralistic ignorance, interpreted as a capacity-degrading phenomenon. This approach
doesn’t have to assume anything contentious about capacities because the agent’s ordinary
success is evidence that they possess a general capacity to Φ. Since the patterns of behaviour
after certain factors are introduced cannot be explained by anything other than a reduction
in capacities, this rules out worries about alternative explanations or unexercised capacities.
Once this is in hand, we indeed can use base rates to assess the degree to which capacities
are compromised.
Moreover, this in turn means our conception of capacities squares with Von Kriegstein’s
(2019) conception of difficulty. To say that a factor increases the difficulty of a task is to say
that it decreases the likelihood of success. Using base rates to assess relative difficulty,
understood as probability of success, is not unhelpfully circular as one’s capacity to act on
moral reasons just is the degree to which one responds to moral reasons in relevant settings
while holding certain factors fixed (e.g. the presence of others; the agent’s evidence) but not
others (e.g. intentions and ignorance). Thus, the extent to which a factor decreases degree of
success in relevant situations just is how much that factor increases the difficulty. All-elsebeing-equal, tasks which require more effort, skill, or sacrifice typically have a lower chance
of success, which is why we take such tasks to be more difficult, and correspondingly, for
agents to have less capacity to perform them. However, in order for base rates to be useful in
this manner, we need to first have some idea of what factors to hold fixed, and to have
clarified the role that explanations play in our assessments.
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It may seem somewhat laborious explaining the structure of our reasoning when making
capacity assessments and specifying the background knowledge we draw upon, given how
easily we make these kinds of inferences in most settings. But it is necessary to do so
because, as mentioned earlier, we risk making incorrect assessments if our background
knowledge is incorrect, or is based on certain assumptions, or if we’re considering a new set
of circumstances which impede capacities in ways that we do not yet understand. I believe
that some of the situationist experiments are just such examples. Our task now is to
investigate what particular factors explain the variation in subject behaviour, and assess
whether these factors are the kind of things likely to affect subjects’ capacities.

6. The Situationist Experiments Reconsidered
6.1 Dime
The most commonly offered explanation for why things like dimes affect behaviour is that
finding a dime is experienced by subjects as a piece of good luck, putting them into a better
mood (Isen & Levin, 1972). Although moods are thought by some psychologists to make
people more motivated to help, the effect of moods on attention is thought to be particularly
significant (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988). It was initially thought that positive moods
broaden our attention (Conway, Tugade, Catalino, & Fredrickson, 2013; Fredrickson &
Branigan, 2005; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006), but more recent research suggests this is
mistaken. Instead, many emotions generate an urge to act in some way (e.g. fear generates
an impulse to get away from something dangerous), and studies show that the intensity of
such urges narrow our attention (see Harmon‐Jones, Price, & Gable, 2012 for a summary).
Intense emotions that generate urges to act in some way narrow subjects’ attention, causing
them to notice things in their peripheral vision less, pay less attention to any peripheral
items they do notice, focus more on parts and details rather than wholes, and be more
concrete/less abstract in their conceptual categorisations. This plausibly explains why
Mathews and Canon (1975) observed that subjects were less likely to help strangers when in
the presence of a loud lawn mower. Less intense emotions and moods, such as the happiness
one might feel after finding a dime, have the opposite effect.
Now that we have an explanation for the variation in subjects’ behaviour between
conditions, what should we think regarding subjects’ culpability? I believe that they remain
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mostly blameworthy. The confederate dropping his papers may be less noticeable than he
would be had subjects found a coin, and subjects may be feeling some inclination to
continue walking. This plausibly makes subjects who fail to help in the experimental
condition less blameworthy than they would otherwise be. But this difference is minor.
Dimes and noises are just part of the ordinary furniture of moral life which agents are
familiar with. If somewhat loud noises meaningfully reduced people’s capacity to perceive
or act on moral reasons, it would be a wonder how pre-school teachers could ever do the
right thing. Doris (2002, pp. 31) reports from personal conversation with Isen and Levin that
some subjects in Dime actually trampled on the papers dropped by the confederate. Given
the wrongs in these experiments are all relatively minor, subjects likely just don’t care as
much as they ought to. We have no evidence that the subjects are not sufficiently aware of
the events around them, or the moral nature of their actions.

6.2 Bystander
Evidence that the subjects in these experiments genuinely have a different perception of
their environment than we expect comes from passages like this concerning Fire:
Subjects who had not reported the smoke also were unsure about exactly what it
was, but they uniformly said that they had rejected the idea that it was a fire. Instead,
they hit upon an astonishing variety of alternative explanations, all sharing the
common characteristic of interpreting the smoke as a nondangerous event… subjects
claimed, not that they were unworried by the fire or that they were unwilling to
endure the danger; but rather that they had decided that there was no fire at all and
the smoke was caused by something else. They failed to act because they thought
there was no reason to act. Their “apathetic” behavior was reasonable given their
interpretation of the circumstances.
Latané and Darley (1969, pp. 252-253).
Interpretations of what the smoke was included smog, air conditioning vapours, and
“truth gas”.
More direct evidence that subjects really did not interpret their situation as we do comes
from studies on what factors exacerbate or mitigate the bystander effect. Studies consistently
show that subjects are much more likely to help when the situation is unambiguously
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dangerous, or when the victim explicitly labels themselves as in need of help (see Fischer et
al., 2011 for a meta-analysis). Subjects are also much more likely to help when other
bystanders visibly react in surprise to the event (Darley & Batson, 1973), are blind (Ross &
Braband, 1973), children (Ross, 1971), or visibly unable to help (Bickman, 1971). Cramer,
McMaster, Bartell, and Dragna (1988) found that nurses, who notably have experience in
both giving assistance and recognising when people need medical attention, did not fall
prey to the bystander effect. Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, and McQuirk (1978) found that people
who had been educated on the bystander effect are much less susceptible to it.
These studies cast doubt on the hypothesis that people experiencing the bystander effect
see the moral considerations but simply fail to care about them, or have normal use of their
capacities but fail to exercise them. Subjects’ rate of success tracks the degree to which the
victim’s need for help is recognisable more than any other factors we could attribute as
relevant to subjects’ decision-making. Indeed, if subjects were being motivated by
objectionable attitudes (e.g. lack of concern), we would expect them to be less likely to help
in unambiguously dangerous situations since intervening in dangerous situations carries
more risk to one’s self. Learning about the bystander effect is also unlikely to substantially
change one’s level of concern for others, or reduce the risk of embarrassment that comes
with intervening, and yet it has a significant effect on people’s likelihood of helping. The
best explanation of why training reduces the bystander effect is that it enables subjects to
recognise that the victim needs help. This, in turn, enables them to ignore other people’s
failure to help when interpreting their situation, and trigger the thought that helping is an
action they are capable of performing.
These considerations count in favour of taking the subjects to have a reduced capacity to
recognise moral reasons. However, given agents can be blameworthy for at least some
unwitting omissions, we need some benchmark by which to assess the degree of mitigation.
I think this can be provided by Fire. It is important to note that, had the smoke in this
experiment been real, all the subjects who did not leave the room would have died. Given the
lengths most humans will go to for self-preservation, to insist that the subjects retained the
capacity to leave the room looks less like a criticisable unexercised capacity and more like
pure irrationality. If many agents want to keep on living, regularly behaves in ways
consistent with wanting to keep on living, have many strong reasons to keep on living, but
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in one very isolated setting with no features that are normatively relevant to dying regularly
acts in ways that would get them killed, it becomes much more plausible to think that
something in that setting is interfering with their usual reasoning capacities. The strength of
the bystander effect on perceptions relevant to self-preservation, and the regularity with
which it happens, gives us reason to believe that it would also have a similar capacityinhibiting effect on perceptions of other agents who need aid. Given this, the
blameworthiness of most subjects in Bystander is (at least) significantly mitigated because
they have a significantly reduced capacity to do the right thing.

6.3 Samaritan
The subjects who failed to help in this experiment are a heterogeneous group. Some subjects
seemed to not notice the confederate while walking by him:
When we talked to them later, some of them seemed to be thinking about the victim
for the first time, as if saying ‘Gee, maybe the guy was sick and needed help’. They
really hadn’t noticed him.
Darley, quoted in Shearer (1971, p. 11).
These subjects plausibly suffered from inattentional blindness, a phenomenon where
attending to particular features of a situation causes agents to miss other aspects of their
situation that normally seem obvious. An example of how strong this can be comes from
Chabris, Weinberger, Fontaine, and Simons (2011), who had subjects follow a confederate
around campus for three minutes and count how many times he touched his head. While
doing this, subjects passed a staged fight only eight metres away, in which two people
appeared to be loudly beating up a third person. Though this fight was in subjects’ line of
sight for 30 seconds, 58% of subjects did not notice the fight at all.22
The subjects Darley is referring to may have ‘seen’ the confederate, in that, upon
reflecting on their memory of the walk, they realised that there had been a person present.
But it seems plausible that at the time of walking, they did not notice that a person was lying
on the ground. This phenomenon of ‘looked but failed to see’ is thought to explain why

Most readers are probably also familiar with the closely related studies on selective
attention, where people watching an object being passed around fail to notice the addition of
a person in a gorilla suit (Chabris & Simons, 2010).
22
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drivers are at a much greater risk of crashing when on their phone despite keeping their
eyes on the road (Hyman Jr, 2016).23 This also plausibly accounts for why so many more
subjects helped when told they were not late. Since they didn’t have to concentrate on
getting to the room quickly and avoiding mistakes, their attention wandered more, enabling
them to notice something out the ordinary on their walk, and realise that a person was lying
on the ground.
Some subjects may have noticed the confederate in a slightly stronger sense, but still
failed to ‘see’ him in the relevant way, i.e. that he needed help. Consider the following
quote:
Our seminarians in a hurry noticed the victim in that in the post-experiment
interview almost all mentioned him as, on reflection, possibly in need of help. But it
seems that they often had not worked this out when they were near the victim… it
would be inaccurate to say that they realized the victim’s possible distress, then
chose to ignore it; instead, because of the time pressures, they did not perceive the
scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical decision.
Darley and Batson (1973, p. 107).
Based on our earlier treatment of Bystander, it seems plausible that some subjects
genuinely didn’t interpret the confederate as needing help. They likely had a low-tomedium grain representation of a person lying down, but failed to see some finer-grained
properties, like that he was unconscious and appeared to have collapsed rather than lain
down. If this characterisation is accurate, then these subjects will be only marginally
blameworthy for their failure to help, as will the subjects who did not notice the confederate
at all.
Not all subjects who failed to give help were like this though. Some seemed to have
noticed the confederate and made a decision to continue walking:
For other subjects it seems more accurate to conclude that they decided not to stop.
They appeared aroused and anxious after the encounter in the alley… because the

Note such drivers are blameworthy precisely because a lot of effort is made to warn
drivers of the dangers of driving while using their phones. The same cannot be said for the
subjects in Samaritan.
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experimenter, whom the subject was helping, was depending on him to get to a
particular place quickly.
Darley and Batson (1973, p. 107).
It seems plausible that the factors which contributed to some subjects not seeing the
confederate as needing help, or not seeing him at all, would still have some effect on these
anxious subjects’ construal of their situation too. But one particular consideration counts
against excusing these subjects entirely. If these subjects were anxious upon arrival, it seems
likely that they were consciously considering whether to go back and check on the
confederate.24 This would mean that they had been deliberating about whether to go back
for the remainder of their walk to the room. The longer they deliberated, the less likely it is
that they were genuinely unable to switch tasks. Subjects would be aware that they could go
back, and could have had the sort of thoughts necessary to trigger the relevant plan, and
overcome any inclinations against helping. These subjects would merely be suffering from
akrasia, which isn’t in itself mitigating.

6.4 Obedience
Though we can’t be certain that all the obedient subjects experienced their situation in the
same way, I believe there are grounds for significantly mitigating the level of blame that
they deserve. A number of factors prevented them from recognising that they had a choice,
and without realising this, those subjects couldn’t form the right kind of intention or
resolution to disobey. Subjects who did disobey seemed to do so precisely because they had
this thought, plausibly due to previous experiences, exposure to certain prompts, or luck in
what they were attending to.
The main piece of evidence I want to draw upon concerns at what points subjects
disobeyed, which gives us some insight into how they disobeyed, allowing us to assess
whether the obedient subjects could have done the same. Psychologists have noted that one
of the factors crucial to producing the high obedience rate is the gradual increase in voltage
of the shocks (Burger, 2009; Gilbert, 1981; Zimbardo, 2007). That this played an important
role also seems supported by the fact that in multiple variations of the experiment, most

It is still possible that their capacity to switch tasks or form an intention to go back was
impeded, but our evidence doesn’t yet show this.
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subjects who disobeyed did so when the learner first complained of heart trouble. These
factors are able to be explained by studies showing that humans are reliably affected by
hysteresis, a phenomenon in which the point at which we change our judgements,
perceptions, or attitudes regarding some variable depends on which direction our
judgements, perceptions, or attitudes regarding that variable came from. For example, most
philosophers know that when constructing a phenomenal sorites series and leading students
through the inductive premise, which vague predicate is applied to items in the middle of
the series depends on which end of the series was chosen as the starting point. Although real
adults presented with heaps of rice or thermostats will change which vague predicate they
apply at some point (i.e. they don’t call a single grain of rice a ‘heap’), the point at which they
change from ‘heap’ to ‘not heap’ itself changes depending on which direction they come
from (Raffman, 2014).25
Our susceptibility to hysteresis seems to explain both why the gradual increase in shocks
is such an important factor, and why most subjects who disobeyed did so when the learner
first complained of heart trouble. Complaining of heart trouble acted as a ‘line’ for some
subjects to pick out, making them interpret any new shocks as being different to previous
shocks. It seems likely that had there been larger increases between the shock voltages, and
correspondingly larger increases between the learner’s cries, more subjects would have
disobeyed. The gradual increase in the shocks, which were initially harmless and thus
morally permissible anchored subjects’ construal of their situation. It would have been difficult
to see administering shocks at 120V as impermissible, given everything about this decision
looks almost identical to the decision faced at 115V. The gradually increasing scale acted as a
psychological slippery slope for subjects, making it difficult to pick out any particular point
at which they should stop.
In addition to Dimow’s testimony about how he interpreted his situation, another source
of evidence that something changed in the perception of the subjects who disobeyed comes
from looking at the effectiveness of the experimenter’s prods. It is notable that of the four

Hysteresis has been shown affect perceptions and judgements of motion (Nichols,
Huisman, Rivera, Hock, & Bukowski, 2005), other people’s emotions (Sacharin, Sander, &
Scherer, 2012), speech (Tuller, Case, Ding, & Kelso, 1994), hearing (Chambers & Pressnitzer,
2014), ambiguous sentences (Rączaszek, Tuller, Shapiro, Case, & Kelso, 1999), and dating
behaviour (Tesser & Achee, 1994).
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prods used to get the subjects to continue, the last—‘You have no choice, you must go on’—
was completely ineffective. Not a single person who heard this prod continued to
administer shocks. This is curious given the prod is much more direct than the previous
three, and so acted as a stronger form of social pressure, and yet was less effective. Consider
these transcripts from Gibson (2013), where the refusals of Milgram’s disobedient subjects
show they are aware that they can choose to not continue:
Experimenter: You have no other choice you must continue.
Participant 2032: I have another choice. I won’t continue
Experimenter: You have no other choice, sir, you must go on.
Participant [unknown]: If this were Russia maybe, but not in America.
Experimenter: You have no other choice you must [continue.]
Participant 2036: [Oh I] certainly do have, you can have your cheque back sir.
Experimenter: You have no choice, really.
Participant 2005: Why?
The reason the fourth prod was ineffective seems to be that it made salient to subjects that
they had a choice. By telling subjects they ‘must’ continue, subjects’ attention was drawn
towards the supposed force of this ‘must’, which in turn made it much easier to recognise
that no such obligation existed. This plausibly triggered something like a gestalt switch in
how they saw their situation, resolving the ambiguity and enabling them to clearly see the
moral considerations and their options. This then allowed them to attend to certain features
of their situation, ignore others, deliberate, and form an intention to disobey. It seems likely
that if the experimenter had explicitly asked the obedient subjects what their final decision
was, or if there was a large sign saying ‘you have a choice’, more subjects would have
disobeyed. These prompts would have triggered a certain way of perceiving their situation,
which would make disobeying much easier.
Although it seems unambiguous to us what is happening in the experiment, and very
clear what courses of action the subjects can take, a number of factors plausibly had a
distorting effect on subjects’ interpretation of their situation and awareness of their options.
First, the experimenter seems unperturbed by the learner’s behaviour, which would make
most reasonable people question their evaluation of the situation. The experimenter looks
like someone who has a greater understanding of what is going on, and who is much more
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familiar with the experiment. Subjects didn’t have anyone else to look to for cues, which
would make it hard for them to reconcile their initial interpretation of the shocks as harmful
with what the experimenter’s words and manner seem to be suggesting. Subjects would also
have the reasonable belief, at least for some of the experiment, that the experimenter would
eventually come to share their concern and stop the experiment.
Worth considering also are the many things that subjects in Obedience attended to and
thought about, which plausibly distracted them from cues which might lead them to realise
they could disobey.26 Subjects had clearly arrived at the conclusion that they ought to
register their concern to the experimenter in order to get him to stop the experiment. Having
formed this intention, the experimenter’s lack of uptake would be very puzzling, and
subjects’ attention would plausibly remain on trying to figure out why he wasn’t responding
in the expected manner, thinking about whether there was something else they could say to
impress their concern upon him, and weighing up the likelihood that the learner might get
the next answer right. These (very understandable) targets of subjects’ attention would make
it harder to consider other possibilities, such as what would happen if they chose to leave
the room, or call for help, or steadfastly refuse to continue.27
Also notable is that the obedience rate decreased when subjects were in the same room as
the learner, when they had to force the learner’s hand onto a shock plate, when orders were
given by the experimenter by phone, and when there was another teacher present who
voiced some concern. While none of these factors greatly change the reasons that subjects
have to disobey, what they have in common is that they all seem to increase the salience of
either the wrongness of continuing, or the option of disobeying. That salience of reasons can
affect quality of opportunity plausibly explains why many of us feel that failing to save a

The option to keep shocking may also have been much more salient than the option to
disobey because of the effects of perceptual affordances (Gibson, 1979). Subjects are
immediately in front of the electrocution box, and have only the experimenter to talk to, who
keeps directing their attention back to the task with prompts to continue. See Ye, Cardwell,
and Mark (2009) on how affordances can make us aware of the possibility of performing
certain actions.
26

“The thought of quitting never occurred to me … just to say: ‘You know what? I’m
walking out of here’ — which I could have done. It was like being in a situation that you
never thought you would be in, not really being able to think clearly.” - Participant Bill
Menold, quoted in Perry (2013b).
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drowning child is more blameworthy than failing to donate enough money to charity to
save one life, even if we accept Singer’s (1972) argument that the two are equally morally
wrong.
One objection to the claim that subjects’ construal of their situation was ambiguous or
confusing regards their distress: if subjects couldn’t perceive their situation accurately, why
were they so anxious about what they were doing? I don’t think the obedient subjects
believed that what they were doing was permissible. As people with extreme phobias can
attest, perceptual seemings can be very hard to ignore when we deliberate or act, even if
they conflict with our explicit beliefs. Subjects may have had thoughts like ‘the learner is in
pain’ and ‘I don’t want to do this’ or ‘I should convince the experimenter to stop’, and this
would explain their distress. But they may have also simultaneously failed to form any firm
thoughts like ‘I could refuse to keep shocking.’
Even if subjects formed an intention to cease shocking at some points, Cohen and
Handfield (2010) point to a capacity which is typically not identified in discussions of
reasons-responsiveness: the capacity to suppress or cease one’s deliberation.28 This is needed
because our agency itself is temporally extended, many actions take place over an extended
period of time, and it is often helpful to make resolutions in order to prevent ourselves from
changing our decisions at a later time. Someone who came to a decision and then abandoned
it in favour of another decision, before repeating this process over and over, may count as
reasons-responsive at each moment that they form an intention. But such behaviour seems
pathological, rather than a manifestation of ordinary agency. Like other capacities, the
capacity to cease or suppress deliberation is one that comes in degrees. But it is also the kind
of thing which can be degraded by certain factors, and in Obedience, the obedient subjects’
“wills are not merely weak but positively anemic” (Doris, 2002, p. 134). Even if subjects
thought to themselves ‘he’s clearly in pain, now I’ll stop’, the behaviour and directives from
the experimenter caused them to begin deliberating again about whether to continue.
Intentions often come with let-out clauses (Holton, 1999), but if one doesn’t consider what

The ‘capacity to maintain one’s resolve’ falls into this category, but the broader capacity to
cease deliberation is needed to avoid e.g. Buridan’s Ass-type situations. Though such
situations appear able to be avoided with the capacity to form an intention alone, ceasing
deliberation is necessary to exercise this capacity.
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ought and ought not to count as a legitimate clause, one may find that their intention alone
isn’t enough to produce action. Those who successfully disobeyed not only formed an
intention to disobey, they seemed to frame it in such a way that ‘stopping’ was taken to be
inclusive of ‘choosing to disobey any future directives’. The importance of the capacity to
suppress deliberation also seems clear if we imagine the effect of forewarning subjects about
what was going to happen, and how most people behave in the experiment. ‘If that many
people obey, I better take care to keep my wits about me’ is likely to be the kind of thought
which enables a much higher rate of disobedience.
Individually, each component I have pointed to doesn’t necessarily show that the subjects
had a diminished capacity to avoid wrongdoing. But put together, they act as evidence that
many subjects construed their situation differently to how we expect, did not realise that
disobeying was something they were capable of choosing, or were unable to maintain their
resolve anytime they intended to stop. Given the variety of demographics that these studies
have been replicated on (Blass, 1999; Burger, 2009; Doliński et al., 2017; Edwards, Franks,
Friedgood, Lobban, & Mackay, 1969; Shanab & Yahya, 1978), subjects who disobey don’t
seem any more disposed to exhibit virtue, care or strength of will than the obedient subjects
in other settings. Instead, the main thing that seems to distinguish them from the obedient
subjects is the way they happened to interpret their situation. To interpret any given
situation, our perceptual capacities depend greatly on cues from our environment, other
people, and previous experiences, and we often don’t notice what effect these have. When
these ordinary sources of support are removed and replaced with factors specifically
intended to mislead our interpretations, it becomes very difficult to know what to attend to
in order to resolve ambiguities and deliberate clearly. Given this, I believe that many of the
obedient subjects had a significantly reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing, which
significantly mitigates their blameworthiness.

7. Objections
One might worry this argument generalises in such a way that risks excusing too many
wrongdoers. After all, there are thousands of situationist experiments, featuring factors
which we are in the presence of all the time. In response, it should be emphasised that the
majority of situationist experiments are more like Dime, and have only minor effects on our
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overall capacities. Additionally, many factors are likely to cancel out each other’s effects
unless they happen to be influencing us in the exact same way, and our capacity to mitigate
such factors improves the more familiar we become with environments. In contrast,
experiments like Obedience and Bystander are highly unusual, subjects have a reduced
capacity partly in virtue of their unfamiliarity with the setting, and we have good reason to
suspect that agents improve their capacity to do the right thing in such cases with education
or forewarning. This limits the risk that my conclusion generalises in ways that excuse too
many agents.
Still, one might worry that we’ve ended up with a conception of capacities that is too
narrow, or maintain that these experiments are too similar to other instances in which we
blame agents for failing to notice certain considerations or failing to interpret their
surroundings in a particular way. The obedient subjects had the knowledge that shocking
strangers is wrong, and they knew that they were shocking a stranger, so isn’t that enough
to ground culpability given they should have seen that therefore they should stop?
The regularity with which people successfully interpret their situation and use their
moral knowledge to arrive at right action is great evidence that these agents had the general
capacity to do so. It is also very natural to want to focus on these cases to make inferences
about a present failure. But insisting that they therefore had the specific capacity to do the
right thing makes both their wrongdoing and the kinds of factors which reduce the chances
of wrongdoing all the more inexplicable, and this cannot be ignored in our assessments.
When we realise that many factors influence success, and then notice those factors
independently tend to inhibit people’s capacities and judgments in other settings, it becomes
more plausible that agents are having their capacities degraded. It is precisely because
people are so susceptible to the influence of others and slippery slopes that we continually
caution against them, trying to instil good habits and ways of thinking that increase their
capacity to resist or mitigate said influence.
Arguing that the subjects are blameworthy because they ‘could have worked it out’
requires us to provide more than just a “disengaged comment on possibility” (McGeer &
Pettit, 2015, p. 165), while also avoiding ending up with a conception of capacities that is too
broad and renders intuitively excused agents blameworthy. Part of the reason we tend to
think that children lack the capacities needed for blameworthiness is that they regularly fail
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to do the right thing in a variety of settings. While most adults regularly succeed at doing
the right thing and regularly manifest the relevant capacities, I’ve tried to show that they
also regularly fail when in the presence of certain environmental factors, and this failure
doesn’t seem attributable to anything else that could both explain their behaviour and
ground culpability.
In many ordinary cases when someone fails to interpret their situation a certain way,
their general rate of success shows they could and should have interpreted their situation
differently. But in highly unusual, confusing settings that we lack any prior familiarity with,
we should naturally expect our performance to be much lower than average. We shouldn’t
think that our ordinary levels of success are a given and that we can maintain them
everywhere for any task. Rather, we should appreciate how our ordinary levels of success
and thus the capacities that enable them rely heavily upon our environments and other
agents. Such factors are why philosophers have recently given more attention to how our
capacities are ‘socially scaffolded’ (McGeer, 2012) or can rely on a certain moral ecology to
be sustained (Vargas, 2018).

8. Conclusion
This paper has examined how we assess when agents lack the capacities necessary for moral
responsibility, in order to assess the blameworthiness of subjects who act wrongly in the
situationist experiments. I considered some existing proposals, noting problems with each.
Appeals to the reasonable person standard risk missing differences between subjects
regarding their level of capacities. Appeals to relevantly similar counterfactuals risk
misidentifying factors that are capacity-compromising. Appeals to predictive likelihood of
wrongdoing require us to first have certain kinds of explanations which demonstrate a
factor is capacity-compromising, and that this accounts entirely for the decrease in success
rates. And appeals to the understandability of patterns of responses requires us to already
know something about agents’ motivations and capacities. I instead argued that we can
attribute a reduced capacity or opportunity to an agent when this is the best explanation of a
range of behaviour. This occurs, for instance, when the agents regularly fail despite being
sufficiently motivated to exercise any capacities they do have. From here I argued that most
of the situationist experiments involving minor environmental factors such as Dime do not
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significantly reduce subjects’ blameworthiness. Many subjects in Bystander and Samaritan are
excused because they are not able to recognise that someone is in need of help. Subjects in
Samaritan who do realise, and consider going back to help but do not, are blameworthy.
Finally, many of the subjects in Obedience who obeyed are mostly excused because being able
to disobey first required subjects to realise that they had a choice, intend to disobey, and
maintain this intention, and these are things that the setting prevented them from being able
to do.
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